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WRITING THE HISTORY OF SPACEPORT KENNEDY

Dr. Wm. Barnaby Faherty, S.J.
Senior Historian Apollo Project
University of Florida
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32788

ABSTRACT
Writing the history of Apollo so close to the
conclusion of the program has advantages and dis
advantages. The advantages lie in the opportun
ities for interviews with the participants in this
tremendous enterprise, the availability of multi
tudinous documentation, and the opportunity of
weighing interview with documentation. The
disadvantages are those of all contemporary
history: the lack of perspective that only time
can give; the inability to see ultimate results;
and the necessity of causing hurt to some individ
uals. Even if the passage of time will force a
change of some analysis, still the assembling of
the story at this time will preserve factual
materials for historians of future generations.
But some aspects of the program will never undergo
reevaluation--especially the tremendous cooperative
effort of government, industry, military and
university in sending men to the moon and bringing
them back safely.

BODY
Amid the 7,000 acronyms and abbreviations in the
selective list put out by the John F. Kennedy Space
Center, none of you will find GROTSOB. Yet a few
years ago the pad men on the Cape used this
regularly. It meant simply "get rid of the SOB."

like all human beings had their various human
characteristics: some were democratic and easy of
access, some a little bit more aristocratic or of
old line military bearing, some professorial, some
scientific. He concluded: "But one of them was
an SOB. In fact," the pad man stated, "that
astronaut provoked a new term that we used on the
pad: GROTSOB." It was the same astronaut that
the first pad man had denounced.
What did the other astronauts think of him? One
heard about the conduct of his fellow astronaut
and called together the entire ground crew to
apologize; then he came back at 12:05 AM to apolo
gize to the night crew. Another of the astronauts,
a crew: man of the one in question, said to a pad
man: "Just think: I have to spend two weeks in
space with that SOB!"
I do not intend to take away from the honor and
bravery of this man--I will never mention his
name--nor cast aspersions on any of this tremendous
group of men who went off into space. Fortunately,
the evaluation of specific flights and astronauts
lies in the province of other NASA historians.
We're writing on the launch facilities and opera
tions at Kennedy Space Center.
I mention the story of GROTSOB because it points
up two important considerations in writing the
history of Apollo: first, we historian-writers
have to translate the involved jargon of the space
industry into the language of the American tax
payer; secondly, we have to deal with contempor
aries, men who succeeded and men who failed; men
who combine brilliance and pettiness; and some of
these men are looking over our shoulders as we
write.

While reading through an off-the-record interview
an earlier historian had taken with a particular
individual on the pad, I found that one spoke of
the almost incredible shock he faced in dealing
for the first time with a particular astronaut.
The man's language was so grotesque, his reaction
so out of control, that this expert ground crew
man with years of experience at White Sands Proving
Ground behind him couldn't sleep that night. The
next day he replayed the tape to see if he had been
imagining things. He had not. His comment in this
interview was: "I certainly hope that they burned
that tape." The pad man was speaking about one of
the great heroes of the nation.

Before I proceed farther, let me answer a question
many ask, and one that might come to your mind:
what is a clergyman doing writing the history of
Apollo? Let me state clearly that it was not as a
priest, but as an historian that the University of
Florida invited me, a Professor of History at Saint
Louis University, to participate in writing the
History of Apollo, in particular the launch opera
tions and facilities at the Kennedy Space Center.
It was not because Canon Copernicus was a priest
but because he was a scientist that we remember
that he told his 16th Century contemporaries that

I asked another man who had worked on the pad if
they had difficulties with any of the astronauts.
He spoke highly of certain individuals and partic
ular teams. He stressed the fact that astronauts
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greatly from the opinions men held when each left
office. In another 50 years the view will modify
even more. So will it be with the story of Apollo.

the earth revolved around the sun. Not as a priest,
but as a priest-astronomer, my fellow Jesuit
Giovanni Riccioli gave the names of the "Sea of
Tranquility" and "Sea of Storms" to various
sections of the moon in the year 1651. Other areas,
incidentally, he named after prominent Jesuits of
the time. I'm sure he named one after his superior
so that the reverend gentleman would not put him
into some remote Italian parish when he wanted to
continue his astronomical studies. "Crater Hell"
took its name not from the infernal region but from
a German priest-astronomer Father Maximillian Hell.

But at the same time certain views only contem
poraries can give. If we do not get the story from
the immediate reflections and the written memos of
these contemporaries, that may well disappear over
the years, can we see the story as it appeared at
the time? This is a most valuable exercise. So
often we have faced history from hindsight. We're
all great Monday-morning quarterbacks. The story
at Yalta is a prime example of that. We forget
what information our American officials had when
they went to Yalta. We forget that the Conference
took place only seven weeks after the near disaster
of the Bulge; that our scientists had not yet
succeeded with the atomic bomb; that our military
leaders wanted Russia in the war with Japan; that
Russia had borne the brunt of war and had been
successful in two long steady years of advance from
the day of Stalingrad to that time. We forget, in
short, what men at Kennedy Space Center call "the
state of the art": the facts as men knew them at
the time of major decisions.

In short, over the centuries priests have engaged
in the advance of knowledge in a variety of fields
well beyond the basic religious areas. Modern
scientists should not forget that even though the
Commission of Cardinals repudiated the theory of
Galileo, it was still the Pope, and not any one of
the secular rulers of Europe, who patronized and
financed Galileo's studies even after the condemna
tion of his theory. Galileo, further, did not
convince his contemporary scientists any more than
he did the theologians and scripture buffs-
Protestant or Catholic.

The letters of the Civil War soldiers to their
folks at home, for instance, differ remarkably from
the reminiscences of these same men when years
later they looked back upon the only exciting
experiences of their lives. Yet the first picture
was the true one, not these memories that grew more
interesting as the years went on.

In our history, my colleague and I frequently
discuss the introduction of a distinct layer of
operatives to handle a situation NASA could presum
ably have handled itself with its own talented
manpower. Why then did the Kennedy Space Center
contract with the University of Florida to handle
this history? Up to a point the local team of
historians that has been at the Kennedy Space
Center for years could do a far better job than we.
But they would face four great problems: as
members of the Space Center team they have long
since lost contact with the layman's viewpoint and
would most likely tend to write an in-house history
for people in the house; they would not enjoy the
freedom of action that outsiders can command;
removed as they have been from the mainstream of
American historical development, they would tend
to write of Apollo in a vacuum, as if it did not
occur during the days of the burning cities, the
campus riots, the most umpopular war in America's
history; and lastly and of the greatest importance,
the scholarly world beyond the space community
would hardly accept it as an objective study but
presume it to be NASA self-promotion.

The contemporary historian, further, serves a great
purpose to future historians in that from the
surfeit of documentation he selects what he judges
is of value--what men should retain, what they may
well discard. He divides his time between inter
view and documentation and he soon finds out that,
no matter what the man's reputation for memory is,
in one or other instance, his memory will fail.
Two men with a reputation for extremely acute
memories have given us information that simply was
not correct — but only in matters of time sequence
in both instances. These men anticipated the date
of decision or the date of an agreement.
The other problem that an historian of contemporary
affairs faces is the telling of events that might
offend individuals. We may hurt some people in our
book; but we will not hurt them for the sake of
hurting them. If the event or personal quality
does not really pertain to the essence of the
story, like the name of the obnoxious astronaut, we
will omit it. But if it pertains to the essence of
the story and this truth hurts, then we and the one
hurt will have to live with it. That is the only
way that history can serve future generations. We
have to balance interview against interview, and
interview against document, and document against
document.

The qualifications that NASA put down for the
senior historian, that he be not just an historian
but a writer who had published before, adds great
validity, as it did when NASA asked the team of
Constance McLaughlin Green, a Pulitzer prize
winner, and Milton Lomask, a teacher of creative
writing at the Georgetown Writers' Conference, to
undertake the Vanguard history. A writer visua
lizes his readers. He enters into their minds and
their hearts with a sympathetic understanding. In
other words, he comes to realize what they already
know and what they want to learn.

Rare is the man who admits that he did not see the
issue as it would turn out.. Rare is the man who is
not the hero, in some small way at least, of the
entire operation. I can recall the book review by
an American Air Force General, of the memoirs of

But why should we write the history now, rather
than let time put the facts in perspective? We can
see current evaluations of presidents like Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman that differ
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War II.
the most prominent English General in World
advance
This English General had said that he was to
The
to a certain point in Normandy and dig in.
the
American Air Officer distinctly remembered that
to
High Command had ordered the British General
close the gap. To be sure of his facts, the
the
of
on
documentati
the
out
American General got
the
staff meeting, and found a clear order that
and
British Officer was to close the Falaise Gap
Army.
cut off the escape route of the German Seventh
General
British
The
escaped.
Army
Seventh
The
can we
never admitted that he had failed. But what
Robert
that
TV
'expect of a man who said on American
E, Lee lacked courage?
it
If we write a history book that everyone likes,
will not be good history, because not everyone
any
succeeded in every endeavor he set out to do
man
every
more than that British General did; not
went on
had the most brilliant idea but reluctantly
with it when somebody below him pushed for that
the
idea. Or more likely it was the reverse: maybe
to
order
in
and
else";
or
it
"Do
said:
top man
retain his job the man went along with a program
that he disapproved.
see?
From our studies of Apollo so far, what do we
men
We see obviously what can be accomplished when
on
set a goal for themselves and put a time limit
things.
tremendous
accomplish
that goal. We can
President
At the time of Yuri Gagahan's flight,
on
Kennedy said: "By concentrating all its effort
one single goal any totalitarian power can achieve
ng
correspondi
a
wanted
President
The
that goal."
effort. He would have preferred something equally
to the
dramatic but of much greater practical value
Those
world at the time, like desalting the ocean.
were his own words according to his scientific
advisor. The moonshot was the most likely alter
to
challenge
a
us
gave
Kennedy
native. President
show what we as a nation could do.
out
The decision of the President to do everything
on TV
in the open with the entire nation watching
and
put a tremendous pressure on the men of NASA
an
them
from
forth
called
it
but
;
their contractors
nt
extra effort necessary to avoid the embarrassme
died
of public failure. Three American astronauts
on a training session in a spacecraft; the American
public knew about it that very evening. Three
space.
Russian astronauts died returning from outer
manned
We do not yet know if they were the three who
of a
the Russian Sky-Lab; though the presumption
Russian space film seemed to suggest that.
chose
In calling for the moonshot, President Kennedy
the race course and named our entry. Some skeptics
the
predicted that we would reach the moon and find
found
moon--but
the
Soviet flag there. We reached
no red flag.
Apollo drew upon a far wider spectrum of talents
It
than any other peacetime effort in history.
gradually broke down the petty jealousies, the
inter-service rivalries, the previous priorities,
the friction between firms, and sometimes within
branches of the same firm. It climaxed an existing

and
NASA effort to bring together various military
civilian teams, such as the Army Ballistic Missile
and
Team under General Medearis and Dr. von Braun;
its
the Navy's Vanguard team that sent up, within
instru
specified time, one of the most intricately
orbit
in
be
will
it
mented satellites—men estimate
Labora
for two centuries; Caltech's Jet Propulsion
tory; Langley's Space Task Group; a host of newly
of
organized industrial teams; and a wide variety
civilian and military leaders, such as Albert
Siepert, James Webb, Brainerd Holmes, George
Mueller, Lt. General Samuel Phillips, and Rear
Admiral Roderick Middleton.
At the same time Apollo demonstrated what happens
when we let a means become a goal. The moon
in
landing became not the first of our ventures
moon
space but the culmination. When we got to the
that
we had won the race. And we are suffering for
the
now. It was a public relations flap — to use
space jargon—that, try as they would, NASA's
forestall.
not
could
experts
public relations
to
And so part of our historical effort must be
put our space program back on the main flight
pattern. To do this we need only tell the full,
magnificent story of Apollo and the entire space
nor
program as it occurred. It needs no apology
false promotion.
"The real importance of the Apollo program,"
in
Congressman Joseph E. Karth of Minnesota stated
a
an address before the National Space Club over
not
year before Armstrong and Aldrin landed, "is
moon.
the
to
getting
of
just the physical act
Rather, the significance lies in developing the
in
technology to do it. The accompanying advances
new
our economy, in production of new products, in
factories and new jobs — these are what really
not in
earth,
on
spent
is
space
for
Money
matter.
space. The flow of these funds into the economy,
return
and the benefit of increasing knowledge will
'
many fold the cost to the taxpayers today."^
In an adjacent vein, Associate Editor Tom Alexander
wrote in the July 1969 issue of FORTUNE magazine:
"The really significant fallout from the strains,
traumas, and endless experimentation of Project
a
Apollo has been of a sociological rather than
the
technological nature; techniques for directing
in
massed endeavors of scores of thousands of minds
of
combination
enhancive
mutually
a closeknit,
This
industry.
private
and
government, university
man's
in
tool
is potentially the most powerful
after in
history." (2) Haynes Johnson wrote shortly
THE WASHINGTON POST: "Some intimately associated
with America's space effort see its greatest
achievement as a state of mind .... The space
set
program is the cleared proof that a nation can
done
a difficult goal and carry it out. If it has
can,
nothing else, it has demonstrated how America
its
when it wants to, marshall its talent, commit
treasure, gain public support and achieve its
task." (3 *
from
We must remind people of the constant gains
to
space technology. To select a few, we can point
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their enjoyment of winter games at Sapporo, Japan,
and of the golf tournaments in Hawaii on TV through
the use of space satellites; the transoceanic phone
communications through the International Telecommu
nications Satellite Consortium; the weather fore
casting that, for instance, kept track of Camille
and sent out warnings that saved countless lives,
even though the force of the hurricane was as
destructive as the one that killed 5,000 near
Galveston back at the turn of the century; the use
of titanium alloys in oil refineries; the electro
magnetic hammer, developed for use on the Saturn V
at Marshall and now interesting aircraft, ship and
automobile manufacturers; the "o-ring shock
absorber," developed by NASA, and now employed by
many states in their highway barrier system; the
transmission of electro-cardiograms by radio and
telephone from the scene of accidents to hospitals,
to mention just one medical help from space
research; the marshalling of management techniques
to insure an orderly flow of components; a motorized
wheel chair, activated by a sight switch that will
give more than 100,000 paraplegics greater mobil
ity—the result of a device to permit astronauts to
operate space controls when strong gravitational
forces prevented movement of their arms; the Kansas
City Airport Control Room on the 8th floor of the
downtown City Hall that resembles the Launch
Control Center at Kennedy; and fabrics for clothes
and blankets that are light in weight and highly
insulated. The Earth Resources Technological
Satellite (and the Sky-Lab) will provide informa
tion on crop growth, the use of grazing lands, the
ecological effects of the meandering of the Gulf
Stream off the east coast of the U. S.; the
formation and location of icebergs; the precise
area where herring are feeding at a given time; the
location of major ore deposits; storm and tidal
erosion on our coasts; the inventory of timber
resources; the extent of snow cover in the high
sierras; pollution of lakes; infestation of crops;
land use in the clustered cities of the country.
The vast extent of uses of space-gained knowledge
dazzles the imagination. We must let it out to the
general public in understandable but decidedly
steady driblets ... coming ... coming ...

on Earth, is in fact part of the search for know
ledge that is indispensable for meeting those
needs . . .."^^ Congressman Olin E. Teague, a
tiger in his support of space activities, remarked
in the House of Representatives in May 1968, "Some
people ask, 'Why should we spend this money to
explore space when there is so much to be done here
on earth? 1 Well, there was plenty to be done in
Europe when Columbus left it. And there is still
plenty to be done there. If Columbus had waited
until Europe had no more internal problems, he would
still be waiting, but the opening up of the new
world did more to revive the European culture and
economy than any internal actions could possible
have done."(5)
While I like the idea of a civilian agency like
NASA and the idea that it was a civilian who first
stepped on the moon, at the same time I think it
highly imperative that we give to our military
people some chance to achievement other than in
war. I would rather have a future General George
Patton land on Mars than in Moscow.
These then are some of the issues that I would like
to present to you today. There is too much defeat
ism in the entire space industry. We need firmness
of purpose. We need clear cut decisions. We need
frankness in dealing with the American people and
the people of the world, telling them what we have
accomplished and what we would like to accomplish.
We need to pursue international cooperation. One
of the men who is speaking in this Consortium
represents a Franco-German combination in a space
venture. Recall that 30 years ago Frenchmen and
Germans thought they had to hate each other forever.
Ever since the Communistic Revolution of 1917 we
have been justly suspicious of Soviet Russia. We
admire the tremendous sacrifice the little people
of Russia made to repel Hitler's invasion. But we
also recognize the Cold War, the rape of Hungary,
the Berlin Wall, the Cuban missile crisis — the last
two events that occurred since we began our moon
program. We can't scrap our defense; but likewise
we can't go on living forever with rockets pointed
at Moscow and Leningrad. We welcome the cooper
ation in space that will be represented by the
joint effort of Soyuz and our spacecraft. We must
work together to enrich this fragile planet. We
must go off beyond the moon to other areas.

Further, we must be frank. I would advise a frank
statement by NASA, the American scientific commu
nity and the people in the space industry of what
we would like to do in the next 25 years, or rather
37 years. Where would we like to be by the year
2000? State it clearly to the American people.
State it in a blood, sweat, toil, and tears atmos
phere. Tell clearly what it would mean and how
much it would cost, not simply in round numbers,
but in dramatic contrast to the huge amount of
money we spend on pets--as much as we spent annually
on space ventures—on alcohol, automobiles, or air
craft carriers.

When I first expressed the idea that perhaps it was
the destiny of our's and the next generation to
bring the message of the Sermon on the Mount to
intelligent beings on other planets, as Columbus
brought this message to the people of the new
world, I thought it was an original idea. But I
read since that Werhner von Braun had said the same
thing some years before. This may well be our
destiny. Let us face up to the challenge of
history.

To the constantly repeated complaint that effort in
space works against efforts on earth, I suggest a
frontal attack in either one of two ways. Dr.
Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, hit it head-on: "Space exploration,"
he insisted in a public statement of July 24, 1970,
"rather than being in opposition to meeting needs

I thank you.
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